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Good philosophy of education may sometimes leave a reader asking: ‘What now?’ This is
not a hackneyed call for practicality but rather a desire to be true to an idea or experience.
Badiou (2009) asks that we have ﬁdelity to inspiring events, philosophical epiphanies
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included. Good philosophy of education will inspire such an epiphany, but the reader may
still ask ‘how do I stay true to it?’ Rather than critique Tyson Lewis’s On Study, this
commentary will elaborate one way to stay true to Lewis’s claims about studying with
friends.
First I summarize the arguments in Lewis’s seventh chapter, focusing on the predicateless
quality of an inoperative community. Second, pivoting on the idea of infancy, I claim that
dehiscence (a concept found in Lacan’s early thinking on the mirror stage) is adequate for
the predicatelessness Lewis recommends. Third, looking to Freud, I claim that group
formation—a prolongation of dehiscence during inter-psychical behavior—is adequate for
Lewis’s predicateless community. Finally, I recommend a facilitation tactic which may
increase the likelihood of that prolonged dehiscence adequate for creating a predicateless
community where friends study together: waiting to speak.
Predicatelessness: the inoperative community
For Lewis (commenting on Agamben commenting on Aristotle), friends share sharing itself
(Lewis, 2013: 137). To share sharing is to suspend predicates that distinguish particular
qualities. A ‘friend is not someone (or something, for that matter) that has a certain set
of deﬁned predicates seen as ‘valued’ qualities. . .’ (Lewis, 2013: 137). A predicate in this case
is a signiﬁer deﬁnite on an individual such that this individual is individuated by the signifer.
In Quine’s (1948) formulation, being is being in the range of a variable bound by some
predicate (with a quantiﬁer). There is an X that is P, for example, where ‘. . .is P’ is the
predicate. Friendship, says Lewis on Agamben, is a relation between persons without such
binding signiﬁers.
A community of friends therefore shares ‘an im-potentiality rather than actuality (of this
or that set of clearly deﬁned predicates)’ (Lewis, 2013). Such a predicateless formation is
‘beyond any distinction between belonging and not-belonging’ (Lewis, 2013). The
community of friends is therefore a community where people are ‘whatever’ with one
another (extending Quine, perhaps whatever being is not being within the range of a
bound variable but rather permitting variability itself to be unbound, unquantiﬁed). This
‘inoperative community’ of predicatelessness is a ‘state between subjectiﬁcation and
desubjectiﬁcation that opens [each participant] up to a capacity to be and not to be’
(Lewis, 2013: 138).
Lewis illustrates these claims in four ways. I will mention two of them. First is
prosopagnosia, or the psychological phenomenon of face-blindness (Lewis, 2013: 140).
The inoperative community, without predicates, will be similar to a group of persons in
an ‘indeterminate and fully generic, un-recognizable conﬁguration’ which privileges ‘the im-
potentiality of the human to be this and that (to be rather than what it has been)’ (Lewis,
2013: 140). Failing to individuate particular superﬁcies, the inoperative community, like the
face-blind Oliver Sacks, appreciates the beauty of faces in general. We see the theme of
predicatelessness in prosopagnosia because it is a psychological condition where no
predicates bind the individual, yet one experiences the person nonetheless.
Lewis’s second illustration is Agamben’s conception of infancy:
infancy is the moment before the speaking subject speaks (‘not yet’) but after he or she has some
sort of linguistic capabil-ity (‘no longer’). Infancy is therefore both a potentiality (to speak) and
an impotentiality (not to speak)—a privation that is not simply a lack but as a positive having of
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that which is absent. . . infancy ‘interrupts language precisely at the moment when it is
actualizing itself.’ (Lewis, 2013: 144)
Infancy interrupts the binding predicates that might range over a baby, which, like
prosopagnosia, speaks to the theme of predicatelessness. After these two illustrations of
predicatelessness Lewis then applies these concepts to dialog and discussion, citing the
transcribed dialog Towards a New Manifesto between Adorno and Horkheimer as an
example of friends studying together (Lewis, 2013: 146).
If one’s group of friends happens not to include Adorno and Horkheimer, or if one’s
friends are neither face-blind nor (literally) infants, what might one do to become
predicateless with others? I will claim that the Lacanian concept of dehiscence is adequate
for understanding what exactly the inoperative community entails with respect to
subjectivity and, with Freud’s mass formation, working to create such a community.
What is dehiscence?
The word dehiscence has two senses. The ﬁrst is anatomical. As opposed to an evisceration
where innards fall out of the body through an opening, a dehiscence is the opening itself. The
innards do not fall out but rather are visible in a dehiscence. The botanical sense is similar. It
refers to a phase of a fruit’s development where the fruit is ripe enough to split open,
exposing its seeds. The dehiscence in each case is an opening which exposes what is
within. The concept plays on dichotomies of inside/outside and, in the case of the fruit,
old and new (as well as noun/verb). When Lacan utters the word in his early work on the
psyche’s mirror stage (the 1948 essay (2006) and his second seminar from 1954) he means to
evoke this playfulness, for dehiscence is an opening of the psyche.
Three phrases from the early essay on the mirror stage substantiate dehiscence. Lacan
writes that there is a ‘primal Discord at the heart of the organism,’ an ‘organic inadequacy,’
that may be described as a ‘prematurity of birth’ (Lacan, 2006: 78). The ‘Discord’ for Lacan
is between what the psyche understands itself to be and what it actually is, the latter always
inadequate to the former (just as one’s mirror image is never fully representative of oneself).
The mirror stage is therefore a moment of premature birth: if one were maturely born, one’s
understanding of oneself could be adequate to what one is.
In such a moment, to which the psyche will perpetually return (we never grow out of the
mirror stage, but rather over it or around it) every unity perceived in the umwelt dissolves. In
dehiscence, either the object of attention becomes negated (what we understood as a table or
democracy is no longer what it is) or we ourselves become alienated (we are no longer what
we thought we were: labor for instance, or a student). Dehiscence is therefore the phasic
antithesis of the colloquial tautology ‘it is what it is.’ Or, as Lacan phrases it, dehiscence is a
process and result of the psyche’s encounter with the ecstatic limit of the ‘thou art that’
(Lacan, 2006: 81). Building on Fink’s (1995) formulation of Lacanian alienation, dehiscence
may be thought of as the conditions for alienation rather than alienation itself.
What composes such a ‘thou art that?’ What exactly deactivates in dehiscence? Following
Lacan from his early work on the imaginary to the later considerations of the symbolic
order, it is the set of predicates, a subset of the psyche’s total set of signiﬁers, which
deactivate in dehiscence. Dehiscence is therefore a predicateless state of the psyche. While
the concept of dehiscence may be adequate for a general theory of what’s required in
subjectivity for study, a special theory of group formation is required for study with friends.
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Group vs. mass
The psyche desires to understand itself. It ﬁlls its primal Discord with images, shot through
with signiﬁers, introjecting the new elements into its fabric. Such signiﬁers, uniquely and
idiosyncratically delimiting for each psyche that which is permitted and possible, are ‘extant’
in the sense that they are in place before some interaction where friends might study
together. But things change when psyches get together in particular formations. One such
formation is a mass. For Freud (1949), a mass forms when a series of psyches introject one
and the same object, replacing their idiosyncratic and extant signiﬁers with a new uniform
set. In the case of an army, for instance, all soldiers introject the demands of the general.
Thus whatever signiﬁers each psyche may have (de)formed over time are deactivated and
replaced by a new singular object (See Chiesa, 2007: 17). There is a moment during this
process of mass formation, which Freud calls partial hypnosis, wherein each psyche, in a
rapport (transference) with the leader or leading idea, deactivates its extant prohibitions. The
deactivating moment is direkt unheimliech: positively uncanny. In that moment the extant
signiﬁers ‘go to sleep,’ lifting (aufhebung) at the outset of mass formation. Therefore, just
before the introjection of the new signiﬁers, there is a dehiscence; though the dehiscence ends
quickly when the leader replaces the extant signiﬁers with the new set.
Another formation is possible, however. A leader or facilitator can discourage psyches
from introjecting the new set of signiﬁers, and instead encourage them to introject many set
of signiﬁers, or no set of signiﬁers in particular (as Agamben would write it: whatever).
Group formation, rather than mass formation, occurs when psyches do not introject one and
the same set of signiﬁers but rather many, or none in particular. Thus the predicateless
dehiscence prolongs. Since hypnosis occurs through eye contact and aural contact or
voice, to facilitate group formation, the facilitator (and any other participant) must not
become the singular focal point of attention during the verbal form of interaction. As
James T. Dillon (1990) claims, discussion must have an equality and variety in the
sequence of turns taken during interaction.
Waiting for dehiscence: studying with friends
For teachers, facilitators, and active participants in discussion it can be diﬃcult to resist the
temptation to speak at length and follow up other participants’ comments. However, the
inoperative community hangs in the balance: so long as no one participant of the interaction
is the constant focal point of attention, all participants have the opportunity to prolong
dehiscence together and linger in a predicateless inter-subjectivity. If the facilitator, teacher,
or talkative person waits, there is a greater likelihood that many other voices and objects will
be introjected rather than just one, and thus a greater likelihood that the extant sets of
signiﬁers local to each participant psyche will deactivate, suspend, and remain in that
state as talking proceeds. The next time the reader is leading or participating in a
classroom discussion (or reading group, dinner party, or any sort of discussion), try
waiting until every other participant has spoken before speaking again. With a greater
likelihood of predicatelessness, the participants, as friends, can study together.
Florelle D’Hoest
It seems that learning has become the educational practice par excellence of our lives: this is
the so-called ‘learning society.’ Some scholars are taking a critical stand towards this
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‘learning apparatus:’ they argue that it serves the mainstream logic of capitalism, which is the
logic that currently rules our lives (Biesta, 2006; Masschelein and Simons, 2008).
‘Biocapitalism’ has taken over education, narrowing it down to learning: we are expected
to be eternal learners, permanently updated workers tuned into the changing laws of the
market. Tyson Lewis is one of these critical scholars; according to him, there are alternative
educational practices that keep away from the logic of the market, and are threatened by the
learning empire. In his new book On Study, Lewis has the remarkable merit of bringing a
forgotten educational phenomenon back to life: study. At the core of his essay is the concept
of ‘potentiality’; drawing mainly on Giorgio Agamben’s account, Lewis explores ‘the
implicit potentiality of studying as a radical alternative to the educational logic of
biocapitalism’ (Lewis, 2013: 15).
Yet potentiality is a key concept of the mainstream educational logic as well, although the
diﬀerence with Agamben’s account is huge. According to Lewis, ‘potentiality is what must be
actualized over and over again through the learning of skills’ (Lewis, 2013: 5). The changing
laws of the market set the frantic pace of actualization of the learners: ‘they become a generic
potentiality subjected to relentless actualization according to the necessities of market
control and institutional capture’ (p. 9). But, as we know from Aristotle, potentiality is
not motion (yet), is not change (yet); whereas actuality is change or motion, potentiality
is (merely) the principle of change. On this point, such an educational practice as study
‘releases potentiality from its submission to future actualization/determination’ (p. 114),
therefore it interrupts the logic of learning. This interruption is a gesture of freedom per
se (as Jacques Rancie`re (1998, 2006) would word it, a political gesture): by suspending his
actualization, the studier refuses to serve the mainstream logic of biocapitalism. Indeed,
while we are immersed in study, we are in no hurry to choose: we hold a bunch of
possibilities together, without realizing any of them. Study is an alternative to the logic of
learning, which usually expects us to master certain content, to become a doctor or a
carpenter, a teacher or a student, ‘this or that’ option.
What I especially appreciate in On Study is this claim for a space and time of freedom, in
which we can suspend the ordered set of determinations established by the logic of learning.
It is only by stopping or by taking (or wasting) some time that someone might consider (and
maybe end up taking) alternative pathways that were not made for her. (In my opinion, this
is when Lewis’s political gesture of freedom becomes educational, thanks to what he calls
‘studious play.’) While I mostly agree with Lewis’s apology of study, I do not share his
critique of learning. In my opinion, what we should complain about and denounce is not that
education in our biocapitalist era has been narrowed down to learning skills, but that the
mainstream logic of capitalism exploits the concept of learning in order to rule our society.
Being called to any kind of job, at any time, in order to serve our changing economy is
questionable; but who would ever put down the necessity of learning all life long (even if the
reason behind is to adapt our skills to the ever-changing market)? This stratagem renders
certain educational features of the experience of learning invisible.
Although learning has ‘its concrete cartographic inscription in the grammar of the
schoolhouse’ (Lewis, 2013: 95), we know that learning is neither the only object nor the
property of school. Many scholars, Ivan Illich probably being the most renowned among
them (Masschelein and Simons, 2013: 9), have even shown that our modern educational
institutions are not the best place to learn. Learning occurs all the time, in and outside
school, and is therefore not essentially related to its current wording in terms of work
skills, which Lewis and other scholars timely denounce. Indeed, I will argue that learning
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is closer to study than Lewis claims. In the following, drawing on the French philosopher
Gilles Deleuze, I will outline three features that suggest an alternative account of learning:
unlearning, wasting time, and stupidity.
According to Lewis, study deals with signatures. Whereas ‘The signature is [. . .] not a
demand for this or that type of action, conclusion, or knowledge but rather a demand to
explore the freedom of this obscurity, which has no destiny of its own’ (Lewis, 2013: 93),
learning ‘teaches the proper use and meaning of signs and things’ (p. 75). Drawing on
Marcel Proust, Deleuze wrote: ‘Learning is essentially concerned with signs’ (2000: 4).
But, contrary to what we might think, these signs do not immediately trigger any action or
lead to any conclusion. Instead, the signs rarely lead us to what we expected to discover.
That is why apprenticeship—a word used by Deleuze’s translators alongside ‘learning’,
meaning ‘apprentissage’—involves moments of profound disappointment. Thus, learning
usually begins by unlearning: indeed, learning always produces ‘images of death’ (Deleuze,
1994: 23), since it consists in ‘composing the singular points of one’s own body or one’s
own language with those of another shape or element, which tear us apart’ (p. 196).
Consequently, rather than pushing us into action or into conclusion, the signs that are
to be deciphered ﬁrst submerge the learner into obscurity, even threatening her with
death.
Beyond the conceptual diﬀerences—should there be any—between signs and signatures,
Lewis–Agamben and Deleuze–Proust share the same gesture: not to ‘collect signs and things
in order to reproduce them’ but rather to ‘collect signatures in order to get lost, wander’
(Lewis, 2013: 94). Thus ‘signs are the object of a temporal apprenticeship, not of an abstract
knowledge’ (Deleuze, 2000: 4). Once the ﬁrst moment of disappointment passes through, a
long, very long journey comes. . .. For we learn ‘by the intermediary of signs, by wasting
time, and not by the assimilation of objective content’ (p.22). Since learning always entails
unlearning what we already know, and renouncing what we had expected to encounter; since
apprenticeship is always a waste of time (not because this or that skill takes long time to be
learned, but because we get lost, for we ignore where the sign will ﬁnally lead us to) we
necessarily look stupid while we learn. However, this stupidity is not bad per se; stupidity is
indeed a ‘good sign’, for it is the very condition for apprenticeship. As Lewis quotes:
‘Stupidity (not error) constitutes the greatest weakness of thought, but also the source of
its highest power in that which forces it to think’ (Lewis, 2013: 131; Deleuze, 1994: 275). We
are forced to think, forced to learn, by cruel signs that call upon us, promising a satisfactory
end—knowledge, skill. . .—that seems to never come. This is a daunting price to pay:
unlearning what we have learned, wasting time, being stupid. . . In the end, learning may
be actually closer to potentiality and study than Lewis argues in his book.
One last remark about study and actualization. According to Lewis, potentiality is study’s
‘natural environment’ or condition; however, given that potentiality always tends to
actualization, so does study: ‘Studious play is the moment when melancholy becomes
inspiration, when undergoing becomes undertaking, when the old is opened up again to
the possibility of the new’ (Lewis, 2013: 120). Although the studier desires to remain in
potentiality, he is dragged further around: ‘Studying suspends ends yet does not retreat
into pure potentiality. [. . .] As such, studying holds within it both the pleasure of
undertaking (a new project) and the interminable pain of undergoing (an indeﬁnite
process)’ (p. 147). Yet the author, who ends On Study writing that ‘To end a book with a
small if not impotent constellation of six remnants is to end without conclusions,
proclamations or even declarations’ (p.175) has produced a book, in which he has drawn
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at least one conclusion: to study is not to learn. Let’s say that this conclusion is the
actualization of Lewis’s study (it is what Lewis has learned through his study on study!).
However, Lewis writes that this is not a destination, but ‘a threshold that returns us all back
to the labyrinth for more tinkering.’ From this standpoint, I guess that my text is
a—stupid—attempt of re-potentializing Lewis’s signs or signatures. But then, if it is true
that ‘We tinker with thought when we dialogue with friends’ (p.145), I can say in turn that it
is by tinkering with Lewis’s line of thought that I have become his friend.
Derek R Ford
The theory of study that Lewis develops throughout his newest book takes aim at
biocapitalism and its educational logic: the logic of learning. The act of studying is to be
embraced because it resists the push toward actualization that deﬁnes the learning society
and its attendant techniques and technologies. Instead of being located on the teleological
trajectory from ‘I cannot to I can’, the studier dwells within the tautological state of im-
potentiality, the state of the ‘I can, I cannot.’ This opens up new pathways for being and
thinking. As he puts it in one formulation,
Studying suspends ends yet does not retreat into pure potentiality. It is the ambiguous state of
recessive sway that holds within itself this or that without choosing either. As such, studying
holds within it both the pleasure of undertaking (a new project) and the interminable pain of
undergoing (an indeﬁnite process). (Lewis, 2013: 147)
While Lewis develops this theory in rich and compelling ways throughout the book, there
remains a certain kind of abstraction. It is not abstract in the sense that it is ‘too theoretical’
or ‘inaccessible.’ Indeed, one of the strengths of the book is the way that it makes accessible,
lively, and relatable the dense, and often diﬃcult writings of Agamben. I am referring instead
to an insuﬃcient abstraction. What I mean is this: the ﬁgure of the studier, the one who
studies, is abstracted at a level of generality that does not correspond adequately to the
current conﬁgurations of biocapitalism. Thus, I am led to wonder what an actually existing
studier might look like. Can any body or mind study?
‘The studier,’ Lewis writes,
stands before a world where fragments open new paths, yet these paths are immediately left idle
as further paths open. In other words, no path, codex, or encounter shines forth as any more
meaningful or signiﬁcant than any other. Because the grip of meaningful solicitations have
waned, the studier is freed to wander, achieving a kind of maximal ﬂexibility to explore
whatever remains in the wake of nihilistic world collapse. . . When all ontological diﬀerences
disappear, all that is left is a potentiality without a project or focal practice. (p. 35)
One of these scenes of study is the library and collection of Aby Warburg, a wealthy
German art and cultural theorist who arranged and rearranged his library according to his
own shifting research interests. Upon his death, the library remained cataloged the way that
Warburg left it. If the collection had been rearranged according to a standardized
bibliographic system, the signatures would have been normalized and captured in the
name of pre-established signiﬁer-signiﬁed relations. My question is this: As we wander
through the labyrinth of the library, do we all have the privilege of being freed from
ontological diﬀerences? I want to examine this question in relation to some of studying’s
conditions.
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First, the racial conditions of study: George Yancy recently came to my university and, in
his brown bag talk, commented on how, as a Black professor, the movement of his hand
toward a book of modern philosophy is often a strange occasion. He gave the example of
Kant. Here is a mighty philosopher, he said, who thought of Black people as incapable of
true education, as ‘triﬂing’, as without ‘any mental capacities to be self-motivated and
successful.’ This fact literally disrupts the movement of his hand toward the book, a
disruption that is not present when my hand does the same. I wonder: can professor
Yancy study in the same way as me? Now, it may be the case that, as Lewis says,
professor Yancy is then able to pursue and study this contradiction. In this sense, then,
yes, professor Yancy can study in the same way as me. But our experiences studying will be
radically diﬀerent because the weight of history and the present bears down on us diﬀerently.
We study in a racist world and, as philosophers, we study from and in a discipline with a
history—and a present—of racism. It may be easier for some to be freed from the pre-
established signiﬁer-signiﬁed relations than others.
Second, the air conditions of study: The ontological fact of identity, while complex and
constantly changing, will permeate and structure the space and act of study. It is, quite
literally, in the air. Consider the modern ventilation systems that heat and cool, humidify
and dehumidify, direct, ﬁlter, and purify the air. The foundational elements of these systems
were developed in elite US universities during the 1920s and 1930s by upper-class white men.
Michelle Murphy (2006) writes about these research studies into the ‘comfort zone’ by
members of the American Society for Heating and Ventilation Engineers. White men (in
boxers) were placed in boxes, and air—with a certain temperature, humidity, and ﬂow—was
pumped in. The comfort zone was generated through the comparison of inputs and outputs:
‘The artiﬁcial climate made within the environmental chamber was the input. The output
was comfortable and productive labor as indicated by such physiological measurements as
those of pulse, weight loss, ‘‘metabolism’’ (exhaled breath), and body temperature’ (p. 25).
These measurements then became generalized and inscribed in a whole host of technologies
upon which our contemporary built-environment depends and, through this, white, male,
upper-class norms of comfort were universalized. Moreover, as these identity-laden notions
of comfort are generated in some spaces, air elsewhere becomes heated and polluted. This
common air, then, becomes highly striated and struggled over, structuring spaces of study in
radically unjust and unequal ways.
The point that I want to make in relation to Lewis’s book is this: there are a host of social
and material elements and processes—a political economy—that structure (and, in some
ways, determine) one’s ability to study at a given moment and in a given space. The point
of this is not to negate in any way the theory of study, or even to ‘complicate’ it; the point is
rather to begin to deepen the exploration of the dimensions of studying, bringing them to an
appropriate level of abstraction. This is a critique that has been leveled against Agamben
previously. Catherine Mills (2008), for example, ends her book on Agamben by stating that
his work ‘begs the question of what signiﬁcance race, gender, sexuality, class, and other
determinants of political subjectivity and power have within the context of global biopolitics’
(pp. 135–136). I believe that this is critique must be constantly attended to as we dwell within
the educational im-potentiality of Agamben.
Finally, the political conditions of study: I had the pleasure of reviewing this book for
Studies in Philosophy and Education, and I ended that review by questioning Lewis’s
embracement of Bartleby, writing that
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Bartleby, ‘preferring not’ to eat, eventually starved to death in a prison in lower Manhattan. And
in a world where millions of children starve to death each year not because they ‘‘prefer not’’ to
eat but because they have no access to food, I hesitate to embrace Bartleby as radically as On
study does. (Ford, 2014: 111)
And, in his thoughtful response, Lewis replied:
Although Ford’s observation is a pointed provocation, it is nothing more than a provocation
because the two cases are completely unrelated. The starving child ﬁnds himself in a condition of
radical impotentiality divorced from any potentiality to eat whereas Bartleby is in a condition of
radical im-potentiality (he can and cannot eat simultaneously). The diﬀerence here would be
between starving from simple lack of food versus going on a hunger strike. (Lewis, 2014: 115)
Yes, it is absolutely true that the two cases are diﬀerent, and Lewis makes this clear. While
they are diﬀerent, however, they are not unrelated. Seen within the actually existing context
of global biocapitalism, there are complex interactions of a whole host of mechanisms of
international politics such as tariﬀs, border policies, bank loans, fertilizer technologies, labor
unions and class relations, supply chains and cold chains, state legislations, military
interventions, and so on that make it so that particular groups ﬁnd themselves ‘in a
condition of radical impotentiality divorced from any potentiality to eat’ while others ﬁnd
themselves ‘in a condition of radical im-potentiality,’ where they can and cannot eat. In
actually existing biocapitalism, studying has its conditions, and I have brieﬂy touched on
some of its spatial, racial, and air conditions. One way in which to keep these conditions in
mind is to hold studying in tension with recent work in critical pedagogy that has sought to
foreground global political economy (e.g. McLaren, 2005). In this way, we can work to
ensure that studying is not a privilege aﬀorded only to a select few, but can become a
common condition of the global multitude.
Samuel D Rocha
Brevity may be the soul of wit, but it also can be the root of oversimpliﬁcation. In this short
review, then, I would like to limit my remarks to a series of repetitions, orbiting similar
themes and ideas.
The ﬁrst thing that cannot be overlooked is the sheer ambition of this book, most evident
in the fact that it seems to be a study of study. This also reveals one of the key challenges
facing the sort of thing that Tyson Lewis intends to describe when he invokes the operative
term, ‘study.’ Consider the following senses of ‘study’: to study x (To study a rock); a study
of x (A study of a person’s oeuvre); to study for x (To study for an exam); to study as a
general expression for examination, perception, or thinking (To study a situation); study as a
ﬁeld or discipline (Cultural studies). These examples ought to show that a study of study is
not a clear way to understand this book, or any other, without a more careful understanding
of what, exactly, is being treated. A notion or theory of study, then, can only be achieved
after the term itself has been operationalized and used consistently. While I would not say
that Lewis is inconsistent, I would say that the way the term is used across the book seems to
assume that ‘study’ as a term is far less complex than it really is in ordinary language and
this, in my view, reveals something important about the sort of study that Lewis is
elucidating.
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The terminological issue also opens a further question about what this book is trying to
study (in the sense of studying something like a rock). I think it is clear in the performance
of the prose and scholarship that this is not a study of other studies of study; nor is it a study
of a notion of study. Instead, we see what I would call a reading of ‘study’ through the
lens of Agamben’s political theory. There seem to be two possibilities here. On the one hand,
there is an ontological sense of study as a world or a horizon of sorts; in this version, study is
something like an ontological condition or mode of being that can be understood
phenomenologically. On the other hand, there is a genealogical sense of study in relation
to the constitution of the modern subject; in this version, study is something that depends on
a particular, genealogical understanding. In both cases im-potentiality is key. Lewis oﬀers
signiﬁcant insights in each of these senses, but the inability to account for their diﬀerences is
a categorical weakness that also raises the diﬃculty of trying to combine ontological and
genealogical methods of analysis into a single philosophical thread.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the book is unrelated to a precise notion of study.
Lewis joins a growing number of contemporary philosophers of education in critiquing
‘learning.’ In fact, Lewis seems most clear in his understanding of the problems of
learning when he juxtaposes it from a richer sense of im-potentiality, which becomes the
sine qua non of his book. His reading of learning as a biotechnical resource invites, and
perhaps even demands, his own theory of study as play, that avoids the ‘untapped potential’
theories of learning.
Another signiﬁcant aspect of Tyson’s treatment of im-potential is the apophatic
approach, read through the denials given by Bartleby in Melville’s short story, Bartleby
the Scrivener. Here a cartoon might help show what Lewis is able to bring much-needed
attention to.
There is a crucial scene in the animated ﬁlm Kung Fu Panda, when the master ﬁnally
breaks through in the training of the protagonist, the underperforming panda. Rather than
rely on the rigor of traditional exercises, the master opts for a rather behavioristic use of
food as an internal motivator. In the ﬁnal stage of this initiation the panda shows his mastery
by ﬁghting for and winning a dumpling and then, triumphantly, choosing to not eat it. He
wins the prize from his master by ﬁghting, but by tossing it back to him, he reveals that he
has truly won and become a Kung Fu master.
What is interesting about this scene (and ﬁlm in general) is how well it ﬁts Lewis’s
argument: that study (unlike the ‘logic of learning’) is not about self-actualization in the
sense of production or outcomes. This is not about the ‘amen’: giving aﬃrmation and
providing metaphysical reasons and evidentialist arguments to support it. Nor is this a
complete reversal, verging on nihilism. Instead, Lewis oﬀers a productive reading of
Melville’s Bartleby, who gives the apophatic reply ‘I prefer not to.’ This reply is precisely
what I read in common with Kung Fu Panda and Lewis’s theory of study, which is to me
more closely related to an apophatic theory of unlearning, leading towards a particular
notion of the self, which I hope he will take up in another book-length exploration.
Here it is important to note that Lewis’s reading of Bartleby is augmented, much later in
the book, by his thoughts on Occupy Wall Street (OWS), as an example that the political
implications of this apophatic theory of potential are not detached or apolitical. Here he
moves from ‘I prefer’ to ‘We prefer.’ Bartleby is not lost; rather, he becomes ‘the ﬁrst to
occupy Wall Street.’
I would argue that OWS, as a political movement, lacked the negative and productive
denial of Lewis’s description of Bartleby as a student or studier. A better, but less
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fashionable, example would be the ‘huelga,’ the strike of the workers movement conceived in
the political theology of Cesar Chavez. The diﬀerence is between an occupation and a walk
out. The gathering of obreros and campesinos is the sort of activism that I see more clearly in
Lewis’s tinkering with study. Furthermore, the immanentized eschatology of Chavez involves
the risk of the Incarnation in a way that OWS and even Bartleby does not. In this respect, I
think Lewis is right to compare the two—Melville’s Christology of Bartleby lacks the
passion of the Passion—but this also points to the fact that the im-potential within
Agamben’s messianism sits asymmetrically in relation the cited example of Tiananmen
Square, and Calvary.
Another example of this can be found in Lewis’s claim that tinkering is a ‘pure means,’
dwelling within what he calls, echoing Agamben’s notion of ‘pure mediality,’ ‘the messianic
now.’ What this lacks, in erotic terms, is consummation. Consider the mad eros of the Cross:
‘It is ﬁnished.’ It is precisely this moment that Agamben and Lewis seem unable to account
for. We can ﬁnd this moment, of course, in any site of true suﬀering, as James Cone has
shown (in The Cross and the Lynching Tree) and wherein Liberation Theology has anchored
its eschatology. If this study without end, however, could be more than the study that is an
eternal means, but, instead, a study in a world without end (in saecula saeculorum) then I
think that Lewis’s theory is, perhaps, strengthened.
In other words, I think Lewis succeeds in ‘tinkering’ with study, with playing with and
being friendly to it, with all the words and thoughts and sorts of foreplay one might expect
from a serious study that seems so absent in the present regime of school-learning, but I am
less than sure that his strongest claim—that study must dwell in an ontological site of a
purely mediated eschatology, a messianic means with no end—is weak enough to succeed. I
suspect his reply would be that this lack of ‘success’ is precisely the eﬀect he meant to
achieve, but, then, he would subvert that claim by pointing it out.
I am left wondering about a blank book, or a silent conference session, an exercise of
study that resembles Yves Klein’s Monotone-Silence Symphony. John Cage? Perhaps Lewis
has imagined a study that is itself not yet, swinging in that limbo that can only be called
purgatory, which, of course, carries the ‘not yet’ guarantee of salvation. In this respect I ﬁnd
Lewis’s theory of study through the work of Agamben to best understood through Dante’s
Comedia and the fantasy of his love for Beatrice described in La Vita Nuova. This may not be
a route for a direct or precise ontological or genealogical notion of study, but it does have
the direct eﬀect of creating an ecology of study in the most literal sense of placing into
existence the conditions for the possibility of free and cacophonous thought.
To the extent that one might wish to ﬁnd a theory of study, for immediate practical
application, Lewis’s book is most instructive and blunt: stop and be stupeﬁed by study;
embrace the collision in absentia; reject the logic of learning. This alone merits serious
and extended attention and, dare I say, study.
Tyson E Lewis
Response
In the postscript to Stanze: La parola e il fantasma nella cultura occidentale (2011), Giorgio
Agamben argues that the value of the book is not simply its explicit content so much what it
does not say. Every act of creation, writes Agamben, is also an act of decreation (atto di
decreazione), which gives the work its life. In this sense, the weaknesses of my On Study are
precisely the points of potentiality that remain within what has been said, or what could have
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been said otherwise. Ford, Backer, D’Hoest, and Rocha have all entered into this weakness
in order to tinker with it and thus continue the act of study. They all tinker with weaknesses
in the book, giving the book another life beyond itself.
Ford’s attempt to theorize the ‘‘conditions of study’’ is helpful for understanding certain
particularities of biocapitalism. But I wonder if specifying the conditions of study makes the
sketch of study I provide too strong. In other words, can a theory ever specify conditions of
possibility and impossibility? My move toward minimal or ‘‘insuﬃcient abstraction,’’ as
Ford says, was strategic on my part, for maximal abstraction all too easily lends itself to
prediction and anticipation. Take for instance the multiple studiers in Jacques Rancie`re’s
book Proletarian Nights: The workers’ dream in nineteenth-century France (2012). Here he
chronicles the subaltern lives of workers who, I would argue, study at night when they are
supposed to be sleeping. Rancie`re seems to warn us that understanding the limitations of the
political economy of the French worker is precisely what obscured Marxists from
recognizing studying. In all cases, it is not clear to me what conditions these disparate
studiers were working under that unite them beyond a rather general condition of
biocapitalist investment into bodily productivity, and it might be dangerous to create a
list of possible conditions precisely because it forecloses upon the surprise of study when
it happens. So what this comes down to is not simply the kind of abstraction necessary to
understand the conditions of study but also the use of such abstraction for calculating when
study will likely happen, how it will happen, and who will be a studier. In short, I worry that
Ford’s list of conditions might all too easily lend itself to prediction or, even worse,
management of who should be studying, where they should be studying, and how they
should be studying.
This leads me directly to Backer’s comments, which are also related to questions of
conditions. I do not want to take issue with Backer’s analysis of dehiscence as a further
speciﬁcation of suspension. I think this is invaluable, as is a move toward thinking about the
nature of the exchange when friends study with one another. But what I want to focus on is
his desire to organize educational moments so as to promote study. My worry here is that
such an approach to study submits it to the world of learning, which is obsessed with
planning, enacting, actualizing, and evaluating. If the book supplies examples, these
examples are not meant necessarily to produce any set of ‘‘techniques’’ for facilitating
studying (indeed the only mention of the teacher is to give the rather vague if not
amorphous ‘‘advice’’ to leave open the space, time, and materials of study). While my
book is full of examples of study, these examples intentionally break with the use of the
example in most educational philosophy where the example illustrates a theory and then
produces a series of pedagogical recommendations. For me, these examples suspend the
move toward prescription (‘‘teachers need to do this in order to achieve that’’), and in
turn, they do not merely illustrate theory but rather create a recursive or rhythmic
structure that sends us back to the theory. Thus there are no real suggestions that come
out of my turn toward Bartleby, who, as an example of study, is neither inside of educational
theory nor outside of it, and as such prefers not to easily submit itself to being an illustration
or prescriptive ‘‘lesson’’ for further improvement of a particular practice.
But perhaps there is another way of approaching this issue that moves us away from
questions of how teachers ensure that study will happen. What is really needed for teachers is
not a list of conditions but rather a kind of redistribution of what can be seen and heard in
the classroom so that they do not mistake study for learning. When students get lost in
something, teachers trained to look for and evaluate education in terms of learning might see
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and hear this activity in terms of learning discourses, and thus devalue study. In short, a
redistribution of educational perception is needed here so that learning is put in its place and
the moments when study happens can be allowed to open up, move about, and dissipate as
they occur.
If Ford provides a tentative list of negative conditions resisting study and Backer provides
a positive recommendation for facilitating study, then D’Hoest takes a slightly diﬀerent
approach: reassessing the conditions of learning. I greatly appreciate D’Hoest’s careful
reading of Deleuze and his theory of learning. It clearly demonstrates that learning
cannot be reduced to the biotechnological ﬁeld of assessment within which we ﬁnd
ourselves today. And I also hope that through her review, D’Hoest and I have become
studious friends! Such is the nature of study. But I would like to take this opportunity to
make a small but important point clear. In my book On Study, I do not reject learning as
such. Indeed, I argue that the real danger is when learning becomes a kind of dominant logic
of biocapitalism, thus excluding alternative notions and practices of education. Where
D’Hoest and I diﬀer is that her project attempts to reclaim learning from its dominant
doppelganger, whereas I attempt to create a diagonal line of ﬂight beyond the question of
learning. I ﬁnd both projects important for destabilizing the taken-for-granted nature of
what has come to be known as the learning society. And yet, if D’Hoest hopes to save
learning from its fate within biocapitalist training, actualizing, and assessing, she has not
asked an important question: What is it about learning that so easily lends itself to capitalist
appropriation in the ﬁrst place? While D’Hoest chooses to focus on the similarities between
studying and learning, here I would like to suggest that their diﬀerences are precisely what
make learning a choice for capitalist production. Learning, even when it involves substantial
unlearning, even when it wastes time, and even when it is most stupid still emphasizes
production, which in turn can be measured. Perhaps it is only in relation to study that this
productivity of learning can be redeemed, and thus be saved from biocapitalist forces and
relations. Likewise, it might very well be the case that through its rhythmic relation to
learning, study can avoid the fate which Bartleby suﬀered in the end.
Finally, I would like to thank Rocha for his compelling and lyrical set of comments. For
instance, I ﬁnd his turn toward the huelga important for thinking through the politics of
study, and for reminding me of the paths not taken. In an attempt to respond to his multiple
questions and proposals, I will focus on only two. First, Rocha is concerned that I have
theorized a particular kind of study while making broader claims concerning study in
general. In response, I would suggest that I am attempting to provide a weak analysis
that connects study back with its fundamental im-potentiality. All ontic expressions of
study, at their base, are studious because they share this fundamental relation to im-
potentiality. Take my own book On Study. The im-potentiality of the book manifests in
three ways: it is neither a complete/deﬁnitive philosophical treatise nor an incomplete
collection of unrelated fragments; it is an educational book as not an educational book; it
is a text that prefers not to abide by the analytic distinctions which Rocha seems to want to
impose upon it (such as ‘‘success’’ or ‘‘failure’’). My hope would be that this minimal
description (predicates that prescribe nothing and thus interrupt the very act of
predication) of study in terms of neither. . .nor, as not, and prefers not to can help estrange
educators from everyday usage of the concept of study (as in ‘‘I am studying for the exam’’)
in ways that make us reﬂect on the nature of such activities. In turn, this reﬂection might
very well release us from reducing study to either (a) mere useless activity or (b) another
name for learning.
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Second, Rocha asks whether or not my methodology is a confusion of genealogy and
ontology. I see the concern here, and thank him for opening up a space where I can try to
examine the philosophical conditions informing the writing of this book. First, I do see the
book as outlining the traces of an ontology of study, which are found in Agamben’s
treatment of im-potentiality. Study is an im-potential state of educational being. If there
is an historical/genealogical component to my argument, it rests not in relation to study but
rather the rise of the modern will and its connections to nihilism. My claim is not that study
depends on a certain genealogical understanding but rather that the theory of study only
becomes possible at a certain historical point wherein the meaninglessness or destitution of
being becomes a general symptom under biocaptialism. As such, it is not a coincidence that
suddenly study has appeared on the educational horizon as a concern. Unlike Foucault, who
would most likely chart the ﬁne-grained diﬀerences in historical manifestations of study, I
oﬀer instead an ontology whose saliency only appears in destitute times.
In short, these reviews concern conditions (positive and negative, enabling and disabling)
for understanding study. What I ﬁnd most encouraging is that each author has taken up this
small, quiet, yet persistent concept and ‘‘tinkered’’ with it. This tinkering has not made the
concept more operative but rather has produced—at least for me—even more obscurities,
more conditions of theoretical and practical inoperativity. These conditions are neither
simply conditions of impossibility (as in Ford’s analysis) nor conditions of possibility (as
in Backer’s analysis). Rather, they are conditions of suspension, or moments of de-creation.
The generative aporias which emerge in such moments are indeed a testimony to study’s
peculiar status as an educational signature which makes possible multiple lines of inquiry,
even as it itself remains indeterminate.
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